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Abstract: Regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) weigh the benefits of regulations
against the burdens they impose and are invaluable tools for informing decision
makers. We offer 10 tips for nonspecialist policymakers and interested stakeholders
who will be reading RIAs as consumers.
1. Core problem: Determine whether the RIA identifies the core problem (com-
pelling public need) the regulation is intended to address.
2. Alternatives: Look for an objective, policy-neutral evaluation of the relative
merits of reasonable alternatives.
3. Baseline: Check whether the RIA presents a reasonable “counterfactual”
against which benefits and costs are measured.
4. Increments: Evaluate whether totals and averages obscure relevant distinctions
and trade-offs.
5. Uncertainty: Recognize that all estimates involve uncertainty, and ask what
effect key assumptions, data, and models have on those estimates.
6. Transparency: Look for transparency and objectivity of analytical inputs.
7. Benefits: Examine how projected benefits relate to stated objectives.
8. Costs: Understand what costs are included.
9. Distribution: Consider how benefits and costs are distributed.
10. Symmetrical treatment: Ensure that benefits and costs are presented symmetri-
cally.
Keywords: behavioral; benefit-cost analysis; cost-benefit; economic analysis; envi-
ronment; health; law and regulation; regulation; regulatory impact analysis; risk and
uncertainty; transportation.
JEL classifications: D61; D62; D78; D81; D82; H43; K2; L51; Q58.
Regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) weigh the benefits of regulatory proposals
against the burdens they impose. They are invaluable tools for informing deci-
sion makers about the effects of regulatory choices; even regulatory decisions that
are ultimately made on political, legal, ethical, or other grounds will benefit from
the structured evaluation of trade-offs and alternatives that a good RIA provides.
Although RIAs are a core feature of regulatory practice in the United States and
other countries (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2007; OECD, 2016) they can be difficult to
interpret. Key methodologies, assumptions, limitations, and uncertainties can be
obscured by dense, technical writing, and RIAs sometimes appear to be “used to
justify decisions already made, rather than to inform those decisions” (Carrigan &
Shapiro, 2016; see also Harrington, Heinzerling & Morgenstern, 2009). RIAs often
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serve as legal documents, running to hundreds or even thousands of pages, prepared
by agencies in anticipation of litigation.
U.S. regulatory agencies develop RIAs before issuing significant new regula-
tions, and nongovernmental interests may also present their own analyses of how
different policies will affect outcomes. Dense or complex RIAs can be challenging
for policy officials and interested parties to comprehend and interpret, making it dif-
ficult to distinguish facts from conjecture and to understand the likely consequences
of alternative policy choices.
While numerous technical guidelines exist to aid development of RIAs (OMB,
2003, 2010; OECD, 2008), none are geared toward nonspecialist policymakers and
interested stakeholders who will be reading RIAs as consumers. This guide attempts
to fill that gap. It first reviews the purpose of an RIA, and then offers policy makers
and other consumers of RIAs 10 tips for asking informed questions when reviewing
and interpreting them.
The guide is designed to (1) explain why RIAs are valuable, review their key
elements, and describe best practices; (2) point out the ways in which RIAs might
fall short of achieving these best practices; (3) help readers to better judge the qual-
ity of information provided in RIAs, and make discerning assessments about the
methods employed; and (4) improve readers’ capacity to critically evaluate the jus-
tification offered to support regulatory actions.
What are RIAs and when are they used?
Before issuing new regulations, governments across the world conduct RIAs to
understand possible consequences of alternative decisions (OECD, 2015). Execu-
tive branch agencies in the United States have for more than 35 years been required
to conduct RIAs before issuing economically significant regulations (those with
impacts of $100 million or more in a year), and to rely on those analyses in design-
ing regulations. Other developed nations also rely on impact assessments to support
regulatory actions, although they are often less quantitative than those conducted in
the United States.
In the simplest terms, the goal of an RIA is to present information to deci-
sion makers to help them to ensure that proposed regulations do more good than
harm. In the United States, presidential Executive Orders 12866 (Clinton, 1993)
and 13563 (Obama, 2011) set forth principles of good regulatory decision-making;
the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) Circular A-4 (2003) provides
detailed guidance for developing RIAs, and its RIA Checklist (2010), FAQs (2011a)
and Primer (2011b) highlight key elements and principles. Agencies have also
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developed detailed guidance specific to their regulatory mandates (for example,
EPA, 2000).
In general, the level of analysis should be pertinent to the decision in ques-
tion. The OMB reviews hundreds of draft regulations each year, most of which
are accompanied by some form of analysis, and, on average, 80 or more per year
are deemed to be economically significant and thus require a quantitative RIA
(RegInfo.gov).
Per OMB’s RIA Primer (2011b), the three basic elements that each RIA should
include are (1) “a statement of the need for the regulatory action,” (2) “a clear iden-
tification of a range of regulatory approaches,” and (3) “an estimate of the benefits
and costs – both quantitative and qualitative – of the proposed regulatory action
and its alternatives.” Thus, RIAs often involve considerations and analysis that go
beyond benefit-cost analysis (BCA, also called cost-benefit analysis or CBA). Nev-
ertheless, BCA, which examines economic welfare differences among alternative
policies, is an important component of the RIA framework (Arrow et al., 1996). For
rules aimed at protecting public health and safety, risk assessment is another key
component, attempting to evaluate the risks posed under certain conditions, and the
potential changes in risk achievable due to different policy options (OIRA & OSTP,
2007). Cost-effectiveness analyses may also be relevant for some policy questions
(OMB, 2003).
President Trump has recently required agencies to offset the costs of new reg-
ulations by removing or modifying existing regulations (E.O. 13771). The OMB’s
guidance on this order states that it does not negate longstanding requirements to
consider benefits or to conduct RIAs (OMB, 2017). It may lead to an increased
use of RIAs to examine the effects of modifying existing regulations, as well as
prospective regulations.
In the United States, administrative regulatory agencies develop RIAs both to
inform decision makers within the executive branch and to inform the public and
Congress. There may be tension between these goals, especially in instances where
decision makers have a politically driven reason to prefer a regulatory option with
lower net benefits than an alternative, or when authorizing legislation constrains
policy options (Lutter, 1999; Graham, 2008).
The 10 tips presented below are the result of a consensus effort of a diverse
group of experts in RIA, organized by the George Washington University
Regulatory Studies Center.1 We recognize that not all of these tips will apply to
1 These tips represent the professional recommendations of the authors and not necessarily the views
of any organizations with which they may be affiliated. As with any consensus document, individual
authors might have written a somewhat different document, but all of the authors broadly support the 10
tips presented here.
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every RIA, and RIAs need not include all of the elements discussed here to provide
valuable information for evaluating policy options. We hope that these 10 tips can
help policy makers and other interested readers to appreciate the value of RIAs, ask
appropriate questions of an RIA, understand what the analysis really means, and
judge its implications for regulatory policy.
1 Core problem: Determine whether the RIA
identifies the core problem (compelling public
need) the regulation is intended to address
Regulatory impact analyses should clearly articulate the “need for government
action” (OMB, 2011b), the core problem that requires federal regulatory interven-
tion. Generally, this should be a description of the “material failures of private mar-
kets” (E.O. 12866, Section 1), although, as discussed below, regulations may be
justified by other goals.
1.1 Appreciate the role of markets when assessing
regulatory policies
The concept of “market failure” is an important one in regulation. In a market econ-
omy disciplined by competition, the exchange of goods and services between will-
ing buyers and sellers uses price signals to allocate scarce resources to their most
valued uses, to encourage innovation, and to meet consumer needs. Regulation and
other forms of government intervention can disrupt those signals, making the mar-
ket less efficient and harming social welfare. Thus, the first question when review-
ing an RIA will often be whether it explains why market forces will not achieve an
outcome at least as efficient as what government reasonably would be expected to
accomplish through regulation.
1.2 Recognize when market forces may be inadequate
Markets may not efficiently allocate resources for several reasons. First, efficient
markets need an adequate infrastructure, including the rule of law, well-defined
property rights, and a system of exchange. Open-access fisheries, for example, may
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be vulnerable to collapse without either an effective system of property rights or a
suitable regulatory alternative. Second, existing policies that were poorly designed
may impede the functioning of markets. For example, economic regulation of pri-
vate sector prices, entry, and exit tends to distort market signals and has histori-
cally kept prices of some goods and services higher than necessary, harming con-
sumers rather than protecting them (OMB, 2003, p. 6). These problems might fit
into the category of “failures of . . . public institutions,” described in E.O. 12866
(Section 1.b.1).
Third, markets may not perform efficiently due to classic “market failures”
or deficiencies inherent in the market itself. OMB Circular A-4 breaks these into
three categories: (1) externalities, public goods, and common property resources;
(2) market power; and (3) inadequate or asymmetric information. (To learn more
about market failures, see OMB, 2003, pp. 4–5, and Viscusi, Vernon & Harrington,
2005.)
In some cases, a regulation may be initiated not in response to a failure of
private markets but to improve the efficiency of government programs, or to imple-
ment a legislative mandate of one kind or another where the underlying objective
is something other than improvement of efficiency, such as to redistribute incomes
(OMB, 2003, p. 5), protect civil rights, or provide for “universal” access to services
deemed to be important. In these cases, the RIA can identify which alternative
would achieve the regulatory goal in the most cost-effective way.
1.3 Question anecdotal or unrealistic justifications
In evaluating the RIA’s expressed need for regulatory action, anecdotal observations
that may illustrate symptoms of a problem without articulating the underlying cause
of those symptoms may deserve scrutiny. Regulatory actions that do not explicitly
point to a failure of private markets or public institutions underlying the need for
action are likely to produce lower net benefits than those that correctly identify and
seek to remedy the fundamental problem.
Regulations that derive most of their benefits from providing private monetary
gains that individuals can achieve without further government intervention, such
as fuel savings from driving energy-efficient cars, require a particularly demand-
ing burden of proof (Gayer & Viscusi, 2013). Does the RIA provide evidence
that individuals behave irrationally (and do not learn) in the specific situation
covered by the proposed regulation? Some researchers have found that carefully
formed “nudges” can help individuals to overcome heuristics and biases to make
choices that improve their well-being (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). What insights do
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regulators have that make them better able to judge other people’s preferences, or
be more faithful agents of their interests, than the people themselves (Mannix &
Dudley, 2015)?
2 Alternatives: Look for an objective,
policy-neutral evaluation of the relative merits
of reasonable alternatives
Regulatory impact analyses should examine human welfare differences among
alternative policies (OMB, 2003). Thus, it is important to look at whether the RIA
considers plausible alternatives or whether it only presents the preferred regulatory
approach (perhaps with some straw-man alternatives). Do alternatives vary in their
stringency? Are different regulatory instruments considered? Is evidence presented
that allows for evaluation of alternatives and their relative effect on human welfare?
Or, instead, does the RIA seem to focus on justifying a particular regulatory action?
Are the alternatives likely to target the identified failure of private markets or
public institutions? For example, if the problem is localized, are nonfederal solu-
tions considered? Or, if the identified market failure is asymmetric information, do
the alternatives serve to address those asymmetries and improve the information
available to those apparently lacking it? If consumer decision-making errors sup-
port the need for regulation, do alternatives attempt to address the identified bias
while respecting the importance to consumers’ individual welfare of being able
to make decisions reflecting their own preferences and resources (OMB, 2011c)?
There should be a well-defined documentation of the economic basis for attribut-
ing benefits to regulatory options that diminish individual choice without consider-
ing alternatives that provide information or establish different defaults to improve
information processing (OMB, 2011b). The set of people granted standing – i.e.,
those whose benefits and costs count in the RIA – should generally be U.S. citizens
and residents, although RIAs may analyze and report separately effects on others
(OMB, 2003).
The RIA should “consider the alternative of not regulating” (E.O. 12866, Sec-
tion 1.a). A large body of regulations already addresses market failures. Because
regulatory proposals are, by nature, incremental extensions of the existing regula-
tory framework, they must provide benefits that exceed costs for small changes at
the margin. Theory and empirical evidence show that incremental (marginal) costs
tend to rise and benefits to fall with intensifying regulation. Given this reality, the
presumption should be against additional regulation without a plausible case that
existing regulations are not adequately addressing the identified market failure.
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3 Baseline: Check whether the RIA presents a
reasonable “counterfactual” against which
benefits and costs are measured
One key component of regulatory impact analysis is identification of the assumed
state of the world in the absence of the regulation (the “counterfactual,” or “base-
line”). The difference between this baseline and the state of the world with the reg-
ulation is the incremental change that the regulation makes, and measurement of
the benefits and costs of this incremental change is what an RIA must do. Thus, the
specification of a realistic baseline is a critical part of determining the incremental
benefits and costs of a regulatory proposal.
In reviewing an RIA, one should evaluate whether the baseline is a reasonable
reflection of the way the world would look in the absence of the proposed action.
Does it take into account the effect of other regulations, the evolution of the mar-
ket in the absence of regulation, and other external factors (OMB, 2003, p. 15)?
Because the future state of the world, with or without the regulation, is uncertain,
an RIA might use sensitivity analysis with alternative baselines to determine the
degree to which baseline assumptions affect the overall conclusions of the analysis.
(See also tip 5.) In all cases, one must be sure that the baseline from which costs and
benefits are measured is consistently applied; if not, the resulting estimates cannot
be reliably compared.
4 Increments: Evaluate whether totals and
averages obscure relevant distinctions and
trade-offs
For a rule with multiple components (for example, one that both sets permissible
exposure levels and requires technology controls), an RIA that estimates the ben-
efits and costs of the rule as a whole, without presenting the marginal impacts of
the key elements, will not reveal the merits of individual requirements. For exam-
ple, the RIA may suggest that a proposed regulation would yield net benefits, but
most of those benefits may derive from one requirement, while most of the costs
derive from another. This would be revealed if the estimated benefits and costs of
each component were estimated separately. In such a case, this incremental analysis
would show that one component had much greater net benefits, and might point to
a different preferred policy.
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Marginal (or incremental) analysis is also important if different degrees of
stringency are considered. Knowledge of the estimated incremental benefits and
costs of successively more stringent alternatives (in addition to the total benefits
and costs of each option) can be informative. For example, when considering alter-
native emissions limitations, the RIA should measure the benefits and costs of each
alternative from the next most stringent alternative, as well as from the baseline.
The “law of diminishing returns” is the common generalization that marginal
benefits tend to decrease, and marginal costs tend to increase, as alternatives get
more stringent. The most cost-effective actions are generally taken first, so the unit
compliance costs presented in the RIA should increase as incremental regulation
becomes harder and harder to achieve. Analysis that predicts that the incremental
benefits of reducing emissions by an additional unit will be greater than those of
the previous unit, for example, might indicate that there are economies of scale to
warrant reducing emissions further (or at least to examine further reductions), or
that there is a problem with the underlying assumptions.
5 Uncertainty: Recognize that all estimates
involve uncertainty, and ask what effect key
assumptions, data, and models have on
estimates
All estimates involve uncertainty, so one should be skeptical of overly precise
estimates of costs or benefits. The OMB directs agencies to “provide expected-
value estimates as well as distributions about the estimates, where such informa-
tion exists” (OMB, 2003, p. 45). Expected value is the most important summary
statistic when the government seeks to act in a risk-neutral fashion (as opposed to
a risk-averse or risk-seeking manner) in the face of uncertainty. Thus, one should
look to see whether the RIA presents unbiased “expected values,” as well as ranges
for costs and benefits.
Further, one should realize that assumptions that claim to be “‘public health
protective,’ which err on the side of overstating risk when data are lacking,” (Gray
& Cohen, 2012) can inflate estimates of certain risks, benefits, or costs relative to
others, and lead to misaligned priorities because the degree of precaution differs
across risks (Nichols & Zeckhauser, 1988; Hamilton & Viscusi, 1999). Moreover,
distortions in different parts of the analysis can interact and multiply, rendering the
conclusions unreliable (Hamilton & Viscusi, 1999; Fraas & Lutter, 2012).
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Analyses that do not provide information on how sensitive the primary estimate
is to assumptions, data, and models, and the range of outcomes possible under rea-
sonable alternative analytic assumptions should raise questions. Sensitivity analysis
examines different “what if” scenarios to see how changes in key assumptions (or
combinations of assumptions) influence estimated outcomes. Because many uncer-
tain factors determine the impact of any regulation, one should look for a convinc-
ing justification regarding which uncertain parameters have the most consequential
effects on outcomes, and a sensitivity analysis that varies these factors over a rea-
sonable range to gauge their effects on the rule’s net benefits.
The OMB requires a quantitative uncertainty analysis for regulations with
likely impacts greater than $1 billion (OMB, 2003, pp. 38–42). One valuable way
in which agencies inform readers about uncertainty is through Monte Carlo simu-
lations that use probability distributions for important analytic inputs and repeated
random sampling to generate a probability distribution for decision-relevant out-
puts (such as net benefits or lives saved) (Krutilla, Good & Graham, 2015). Formal
elicitation of experts’ judgments can be used to develop probability distributions for
analytic inputs when adequate data are unavailable (OMB, 2003, p. 41). The com-
putation of a break-even level of effectiveness at which the rule’s benefits would
justify the costs might also add useful perspective.
The problems that regulations target often have multiple interacting causes,
making it difficult to cleanly attribute the effect of the regulation in isolation.
For example, commercial vehicle crashes are usually caused by a combination
of weather, technology, human behavior, and infrastructure conditions. An hours-
of-service regulation designed to reduce crash risks by mitigating driver fatigue
will reduce one risk factor in this larger cluster. In such a case, where the fatigue–
accident relationship is uncertain, does the RIA use sensitivity analysis to explore
alternative assumptions about the relationship of hours-of-service rules to fatigue,
and the impact of fatigue on crash risks?
Uncertainty analysis can also highlight what additional information would be
most valuable for making a decision. If expected outcomes hinge on the value
assumed for a particular uncertain variable, it might be appropriate to gather more
information regarding that variable prior to making a decision (OMB, 2003, p. 39),
or to ask what policies would generate the information necessary to reduce that
uncertainty (Greenstone, 2009).
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6 Transparency: Look for transparency and
objectivity of analytical inputs
OMB guidance requires that significant information disseminated to the public
be “capable of being substantially reproduced, subject to an acceptable degree of
imprecision” (OMB, 2002, p. 8460). This standard can be difficult for a nonex-
pert reviewer to assess. A precondition of reproducibility, however, is transparent
presentation of the underlying data, assumptions, and models relied on to draw
conclusions. Disclosure of underlying data and computer code has become stan-
dard among the more prestigious scientific and technical journals, which allow for
data sharing agreements when individually identifiable information prevents public
disclosure. These disclosure policies appear to improve the reproducibility of the
results of published papers (Lutter & Zorn, 2016). Without transparent presentation
of inputs used and alternative inputs considered, reviewers will find it difficult to
judge the objectivity or accuracy of the resulting estimates.
Often, less is understood about the effects of regulatory intervention (such as
reductions in health risks, for example) than the valuation of those effects, so one
should look particularly for a clear presentation of alternative plausible models and
assumptions used to predict regulatory outcomes. Precise-sounding predictions not
only can hide considerable uncertainty about risks, benefits, and costs, as noted in
tip 5, but also can mask a reliance on biased inferences and assumptions.2 While
some judgments are necessary to translate scientific evidence into risk assessment,
if they are not policy-neutral, they can lead to distorted risk estimates and false pre-
cision in the presentation of scientific information (Dudley & Gray, 2012). Further-
more, if they are not transparent, reviewers will be unable to judge their objectivity.
If an RIA for a significant regulation aimed at reducing health, safety, or envi-
ronmental risks does not provide a discussion of alternative interpretations of the
scientific basis, it may not be providing a full and accurate picture of potential risks
(Sutherland, Spiegelhalter & Burgman, 2013). Moreover, if it does not provide the
information necessary to assess how different inputs (assumptions, data, models,
etc.) would change estimated outcomes, it will not provide the information needed
to evaluate the consequences of the regulatory action.
2 Former EPA scientist Robert Lackey cautions against what he calls “normative science,” or “infor-
mation that is developed, presented or interpreted based on an assumed, usually unstated, preference for
a particular policy choice” (2013). He finds that “too often . . . scientific information presented to the
public and decision-makers is infused with hidden policy preferences.”
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7 Benefits: Examine how projected benefits relate
to stated objectives
Does the RIA clearly explain how regulatory objectives will be achieved, or is the
preferred regulatory outcome simply presumed to work as intended? The analysis
should lay out causal linkages between regulatory requirements and desired out-
comes, discuss the evidence supporting these linkages, and show how they differ
across alternatives (Newcomer, Hatry & Wholey, 2015). If regulatory outcomes
depend on factors beyond the regulation’s control (e.g., energy prices), one should
look for a presentation of how variations in those factors would affect outcomes.
7.1 Look for evidence for and against a causal relationship
It should be remembered that correlation does not always imply causation, so one
should look for a persuasive demonstration of causation rather than relying on indi-
cators of correlation or association to predict changes in health risks, costs, or ben-
efits (Cox & Popken, 2008). One should be alert for words such as “linked to” or
“associated with.” Does the RIA present information indicating whether a change
in the variable to be regulated (e.g., emissions) precedes and causes a change in
the targeted outcome (e.g., public health) as well as the effect other possible factors
might have on the outcome (Cox, 2016)? Do the underlying studies linking harm
(e.g., mortality or morbidity) to exposure to some hazard use statistical strategies
appropriate to the identification of causal relationships, such as regression discon-
tinuity designs, or quasi-experiments (Dominici, Greenstone & Sunstein, 2014)?
7.2 Ask whether the analysis accurately characterizes
indirect benefits and costs
Some RIAs present large “co-benefits” (or “ancillary benefits”). These may need
closer inspection, particularly if the co-benefits are much larger than the direct ben-
efits, if the direct benefits on their own are significantly less than the estimated
costs, or if the co-benefits appear to materialize “for free.” The presence of co-
benefits almost always signals that the agency is counting costs and benefits that
arise outside of the specific statutory authority that the regulation operationalizes.
That is not a problem per se; indeed, all significant benefits and costs should be
counted. However, in such cases, one might ask why this regulation is the best way
to achieve those co-benefits. Generally, one would expect that regulation targeted
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directly at a particular outcome can achieve it more cost-effectively than one that
achieves it circuitously as a side effect (co-benefit) of an unrelated regulation, and
a sound analysis must make a thorough inventory of both the harmful and the ben-
eficial consequences of each alternative.
8 Costs: Understand what “costs” are included
Ideally, the RIA will estimate the “opportunity cost” of the regulatory action (the
lost value of the best alternative forgone). However, opportunity costs can be diffi-
cult to measure, so RIAs often rely instead on the costs of compliance, measured
by the expenditures businesses make on technology or methods used to fulfill the
regulatory requirements. While business compliance costs are not welfare changes,
they are often a reasonable proxy for welfare changes that are passed through to
consumers, to employees, and to business owners (which, for publicly traded com-
panies, often include large mutual funds and pension funds owned by many indi-
viduals) (Mannix, 2014). If compliance costs are used, they should exclude taxes,
which are mostly transfers to other members of society.
The costs of some types of regulatory actions, such as prohibitions on certain
actions or products, cannot be approximated by compliance costs, however. For
example, a rule prohibiting a specific product may not involve compliance costs,
but it would have an opportunity cost because users would not able to enjoy the
product’s benefits.
9 Distribution: Consider how benefits and costs
are distributed
Those who bear the costs of a regulation and those who enjoy its benefits often are
not the same people. Does the RIA present evidence on the incidence of benefits
and costs so that one can understand how they affect different people?
While some government programs are designed to redistribute wealth (e.g.,
food stamps), others do so inadvertently (e.g., regulations that raise food prices
might have disproportionate impacts on low-income Americans, or regulatory com-
pliance might burden small businesses more than large ones). The OMB calls on
agencies to “distinguish . . . between real costs and transfer payments, [which are]
monetary payments from one group to another that do not affect total resources
available to society” (OMB, 2003, p. 38).
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Does the RIA reveal whether a regulation will have different impacts on dif-
ferent subpopulations, including those living in different regions of the country,
businesses of different sizes, individuals of different ages, and people with differ-
ent incomes or ethnic and socioeconomic characteristics? It might be interesting to
know whether the benefits are “global,” accruing to foreign countries, but the costs
are borne domestically. If so, is that the program’s purpose, and what is the net
effect on the United States (Fraas et al., 2016)?
The OMB advises agencies, “Where distributive effects are thought to be
important, the effects of various regulatory alternatives should be described quanti-
tatively to the extent possible, including the magnitude, likelihood, and severity of
impacts on particular groups” (OMB, 2003, p. 14). If an RIA ignores distributional
effects – implying that they are not “thought to be important” by the promulgat-
ing agency – one should look for a compelling explanation, based on logic and
evidence, that costs and benefits generally fall on the same groups of people.
10 Symmetrical treatment: Ensure that benefits
and costs are presented symmetrically
One should pay attention to how benefits and costs are measured. For example,
both should be measured from the same baseline and over the same time frame.
Similarly, the discount rate used to convert the future streams of benefits and costs
to present values should generally be the same (OMB, 2003). The choice of dis-
count rate can have a very large impact on the present value of estimates, so an
RIA should clearly defend the use of different discount rates applied for costs and
benefits (and present the effects of alternative choices in sensitivity analysis).
Are the boundaries of the analysis framed symmetrically? No analysis will ever
be complete, of course. However, major elements should not be missing on one side
of the equation, or overemphasized on another. For example, if the analysis presents
evidence of co-benefits, are ancillary costs or countervailing risks examined to the
same extent?
Final thoughts
Regulatory impact analysis can be an invaluable method for transparently evalu-
ating contentious policy choices before they are put in effect. The OECD states
that its “most important contribution to the quality of decisions is not the precision
of the calculations used, but the action of analyzing – questioning, understanding
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real-world impacts and exploring assumptions” (OECD, 2002, p. 47). Thus, an
RIA’s purpose is not to compel decisions, but rather to provide policy makers
responsible for making decisions with the information needed to think through the
possible consequences of different regulatory actions. Despite this informational
purpose, RIAs can be opaque, complex, and even intimidating. Wittingly or unwit-
tingly, they may be written in a way that obfuscates important information or skews
the analysis to support a particular outcome.
Savvy policymakers and other consumers need to be aware of the basic ele-
ments involved in a good RIA and the kinds of questions to ask to get the most
from reading one. The preceding 10 tips should help readers of RIAs to interpret
what they read and ask appropriate questions.
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